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WHEN ROBOTS MAKE LEGAL MISTAKES 
SUSAN C. MORSE* 
 
Abstract 
The questions presented by robots’ legal mistakes are examples of the 
legal process inquiry that asks when the law will accept decisions as final, 
even if they are mistaken. Legal decision-making robots include market 
robots and government robots. In either category, they can make mistakes 
of undercompliance or overcompliance. A market robot’s overcompliance 
mistake or a government robot’s undercompliance mistake is unlikely to be 
challenged. On the other hand, government enforcement can challenge a 
market robot’s undercompliance mistake, and an aggrieved regulated party 
can object to a government robot’s overcompliance mistake. Robots will 
have an incentive to make decisions that will avoid the prospect of 
challenge, especially if they cannot defend their legal decisions due to a 
lack of explainability. This incentive could encourage counterintuitive 
results. For instance, it could encourage market robots to overcomply and 
government robots to undercomply with the law. 
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Introduction 
This Essay is concerned with what happens when robots make legal 
mistakes. When an automated intelligent system makes a legal mistake, will 
it stand as a valid and final interpretation of the law?  
A robot, like any legal decision maker, has to defend decisions only 
when those decisions are challenged. And not all decisions are equally open 
to challenge. As it stands now, some robot legal decisions might be 
challenged as unlawful. Others will not be. I argue here that, all else equal, 
robot legal decision makers will prefer decisions that are less vulnerable to 
challenge. This may cause the development of the law to drift in new and 
different directions. 
As Henry Hart and Albert Sacks observed and taught,1 legal process 
helps determine when to respect an institution’s production of law. Some of 
these procedures for challenging decisions could change in response to 
artificial intelligence, since the rules we have do not necessarily line up 
with the robot capabilities we predict. For example, consider prosecutors 
and defense lawyers. As one paper in this issue observes, artificial 
intelligence systems, or robots, might eventually act as prosecutors and 
defense lawyers in criminal cases.2 The job of a prosecutor might require 
more moral judgment when deciding whom to prosecute, for instance, 
compared to the single-minded zealous advocacy of a defense lawyer. 
Other contributions to this issue might take this example and suggest that 
robots’ discretionary or moral prosecutorial decisions should be more open 
to challenge than the similar decisions of human prosecutors.3 Perhaps, in 
the future, law will establish an avenue to challenge prosecutorial discretion 
decisions made by robots. But this would be a change from existing law. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 1. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 3-9 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994) (discussing the idea of institutional settlement and the interaction between 
private and government decision-making). 
 2. See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Should Robots Prosecute and Defend?, 72 
OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
 3. See generally Joshua P. Davis, Artificial Wisdom? A Potential Limit on AI in Law 
(and Elsewhere),72 OKLA. L. REV. 51 (2019); Chris Chambers Goodman, AI/Esq: Impacts of 
Artificial Intelligence in Lawyer-Client Relationships, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 147 (2019); W. 
Bradley Wendel, The Promise and Limitations of Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of 
Law, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 21 (2019). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss1/9
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My goal here is not to propose changes that would make it easier to 
challenge robot legal decisions. Instead, I use existing law and existing 
process to illustrate the interaction between available legal process and the 
content of robots’ legal decisions, and to argue that, all else equal, robots 
will prefer to make legal decisions that are less likely to be challenged. The 
perspective here is ex post and focused on review of robot decisions.4  
The analysis can be illustrated by considering both a government robot 
and a market robot.5 An example of a government robot that makes legal 
decisions is an automated system, developed or purchased by the 
government, that determines an applicant’s eligibility for welfare or 
disability benefits. An example of a private-market robot is an automated 
system, such as TurboTax, that generates tax returns.  
In the case of the government robot that determines welfare benefits, a 
decision might overcomply with the law, for instance by demanding 
unnecessary information before granting benefits. A welfare applicant 
illegally denied benefits might challenge this overcompliance decision.6 
However, decisions that undercomply with the law, for instance by granting 
benefits without all of the legally required information, will not be 
challenged. The recipient of the benefit has no reason to challenge the 
government’s undercompliance, and no one else has standing to do so.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 4. In contrast, I would characterize the ideas of certifying robots proposed in one of 
this volume’s papers as an ex ante idea. Susan Saab Fortney, Online Legal Document 
Providers and the Public Interest: Using a Certification Approach to Balance Access to 
Justice and Public Protection, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 91 (2019). Another paper proposes using 
robots to review human decisions, while my take is the other way around and focuses on 
human review of robot decisions. Anita Bernstein, Minding the Gaps in Lawyers’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 123 (2019). 
 5. Other robot systems that are more securely located in private law, such as the 
systems for will preparation, are considered in another paper in this volume. Emily S. Taylor 
Poppe, The Future is Bright Complicated: AI, Apps, and Access to Justice, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 
183 (2019). These might also have analogous incentives to reach decisions that would 
minimize the risk of challenge. But I focus here on robots whose legal decisions arise in the 
area of regulatory compliance. 
 6. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 
1256 (2008) (describing the Colorado Benefits Management System, which incorrectly 
denied benefits to eligible welfare applicants); Marc Cohan & Mary R. Mannix, National 
Center for Law and Economic Justice’s SNAP Application Delay Litigation Project, 46 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 208, 211 (2012). 
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For a market robot, such as TurboTax, the situation is reversed. A 
decision that undercomplies with the law, perhaps by allowing certain 
borderline expenses as trade or business tax deductions, could be 
challenged by the government. A decision that overcomplies with the law, 
for instance by disallowing borderline expenses as trade or business 
deductions, will not be challenged by the government. 
When private-market robots or government robots make the kind of legal 
mistakes that I have described, sometimes we want to know how they make 
their decisions because a valid legal process can persuade us to respect the 
decisions themselves as final. For instance, reason-giving can show the 
reasonableness or non-negligence of a private market decision. Or it can 
show that a government decision followed constitutional due process 
requirements or the Administrative Procedure Act.  
Robots face a challenge in responding to requests for reason-giving 
because robot decisions may not be transparent or explainable. When a 
robot’s legal decision is challenged, the “transparency” or “explainability” 
of the decision can provide a path to respecting the decision of a robot as 
final and valid. If decisions are not considered explainable, robotic systems 
may not be able to invoke the validity of their own internal process as a 
way to defend their decisions. This may give robots, more than humans, the 
incentive to avoid any request to explain why they did what they did. 
Because of the difficulty robots may face in reason-giving, they may 
have an incentive to generate decisions that run contrary to usual 
expectations. Government robots may begin to interpret the law to include 
fewer requirements and provide a more generous interpretation of the law. 
Private-market robots may begin to interpret the law to include more 
requirements and provide a less generous interpretation of the law. This is 
because it is more difficult to challenge overcompliant private-market 
decisions and undercompliant government decisions. Instead, 
overcompliant private-market decisions (such as declining to claim a 
borderline tax deduction) and undercompliant government decisions (such 
as granting benefits without collecting all required information) tend to 
stand as valid and final, simply because the paths available to challenge 
them are limited or nonexistent. 
 Compliance robots face other incentives in addition to the incentive to 
avoid legal challenge. For instance, market robots generally have a profit 
incentive. If this profit incentive encourages a market robot to undercomply 
with the law, then the incentive to avoid legal challenge may provide a 
helpful offset, and reduce undercompliance rather than causing 
overcompliance. On the other hand, if a market robot’s profit incentive 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss1/9
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encourages overcompliance with the law, for instance because users prefer 
safe legal positions, then the incentive to avoid legal challenge may 
increase the market robot’s tendency to overcomply. In the case of 
TurboTax, for example, profit incentives may encourage the software to 
break taxpayer confidentiality laws but comply with substantive tax law.7 I 
do not mean to suggest that the incentive to avoid legal challenge is always 
an overriding consideration, only that it is one consideration that helps 
predict the direction of robot-made law. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the existing concerns in 
the law literature about the transparency and explainability of automated 
intelligent systems, or robots. Part II categorizes the legal mistakes of 
automated intelligent systems and shows that mistakes of overcompliance 
or undercompliance could be made by either a private-market robot or a 
government robot. Part III uses the examples of negligence liability and 
procedural due process for administrative decisions to illustrate how 
explainability could enable the law to decide that a robot’s decision should 
be respected as legal, even if it is mistaken. A conclusion follows.  
I. Transparency and Explainability 
Transparency and explainability are questions that arise when robots 
make legal decisions. There are narrower and broader definitions of 
“robot.” Some definitions say a robot is an “object.”8 Others define robots 
to include intelligent automatic systems that arrive at results and take 
actions without human intervention.9 I will use the broader definition here. 
An automated system that independently makes legal decisions qualifies as 
a robot under this broader definition. It is useful to categorize TurboTax, for 
instance, as a robot. 
Legal scholars and policy makers worry about the explainability of robot 
legal decisions. A law in the European Union attempts to provide a “right to 
explanation” of automatic legal decisions.10 Legal scholars struggle to 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See Susan C. Morse, When Will a Tax Compliance Robot Follow the Law?, 1 OHIO 
ST. TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (suggesting that tax software preparation programs may 
violate taxpayer confidentiality law and comply with substantive tax law). 
 8. A. Michael Froomkin, Introduction to ROBOT LAW x, xi (Ryan Calo, A. Michael 
Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016). 
 9. Mark A. Lemley & Brian Casey, Remedies for Robots (forthcoming 2019) 
(advocating broader definition). 
 10. See Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to 
Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection 
Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76, 82 (2017) (arguing that the law does not succeed 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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reconcile existing legal tools for validating decisions with the black-box 
nature of automatic decisions. How can we determine the negligence of an 
algorithm too complex for human processing or evaluate whether due 
process is met when machine learning manipulates data to maximize the 
correlation of different variables through a process very difficult or 
impossible to reverse engineer? Legal scholars recommend access to the 
inner workings and data inputs of automated systems as a solution to the 
problem of explainability.11 Some suggest that the right approach is for law 
to evolve and develop the expertise necessary to evaluate the quality of the 
data input and machine-learning models used by automatic systems, just as 
law has earlier developed the capacity to evaluate the quality of statistical 
analysis.12 Others suggest that automated systems may prove unable to 
fulfill law’s requirements for explainability.13  
Some objects or goals of automated system explainability have been 
identified in the scholarship that explores it. The goals involve reason-
giving and providing tools that will help a rightful plaintiff develop her case 
challenging the automated system’s legal result. But the function of 
explainability—or not—in the development of the law created by robots 
still deserves further study. 
The question of explainability has to do with institutional competence, or 
institutional settlement, which is to say the legal process issue of when we 
will treat a decision made by a particular legal institution as a final and 
lawful decision. Robots act as instruments of other existing institutions, in 
particular the “fourth branch,” also known as administrative agencies;14 and 
private ordering, which is sometimes called the “fifth branch,” especially 
when it engages in explicit self-regulation.15  
                                                                                                                 
in part because it does not engage the question of whether the right relates to an “ex ante 
explanation” of system logic or functionality or an “ex post” explanation of how a particular 
decision was reached). 
 11. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 6, at 1305-13 (recommending “audit trails,” the release 
of source code, testing suites and public participation in the building of automated systems). 
 12. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (2019) [hereinafter Coglianese & Lehr, Transparency] (citing 
Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 640 n.14 (2017)). 
 13. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
 14. See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive 
Branch, 94 YALE L. J. 1766, 1766 (1985) (citing use of the term “fourth branch” in 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)). 
 15. See, e.g., Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private 
Regulators and Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 165 (1989). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss1/9
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 Existing law helps us see when robot decisions—whether by fourth-
branch, or government, robots or fifth-branch, or private-market, robots—
will be open to challenge and when we will respect them as final without 
giving any avenue for challenge. We care about explainability when 
decisions are open to challenge, because explainability determines the 
ability of a robot to give reasons that may persuade us to accept its decision, 
even if a different institution, like a court, might make a different decision. 
Generalizing the question in this way allows us to observe the vulnerability 
of robot decisions that are (i) not explainable and (ii) open to challenge.  
II. A Typology of Robot Legal Mistakes 
A. Market and Government Robots, Overcompliance and Undercompliance 
Mistakes 
This Part seeks to show that robots’ legal mistakes can go in different 
directions. In other words, mistakes can be overinclusive or underinclusive. 
I use the example of compliance with an environmental emissions 
regulation to argue that either overcompliance or undercompliance mistakes 
could be made by either a government robot or a private-market robot. That 
is, a fourth-branch administrative agency or government robot could either 
overcomply, by restricting emissions too tightly, or undercomply, by 
allowing too much pollution. Likewise, a fifth-branch private ordering or 
market robot could allow either too little or too much pollution.  
The below two-by-two matrix summarizes the mistakes a robot could 
make in interpreting a regulation that allows a certain emissions level for a 
certain pollutant. The robot’s task in this example involves legal judgment 
calls at one or more steps in its compliance process. For instance, the robot 
might measure source data about the pollutant, including making decisions 
about the validity of the data. Or, the robot might compare the data to the 
permitted emissions level to see if the emissions were “compliant,” perhaps 
translating continuous data about emissions to a standard written using a 
different measurement unit. Or, the robot might face a pollutant with a 
somewhat different chemical makeup than that mentioned in guidance. 
Other judgment calls might present when the robot prepares and submits a 
report to the government verifying compliance or admitting noncompliance.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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Table 1: Undercompliance/Overcompliance 
in Market/Government Robots 
 
 Market robot Government robot 
 
Undercompliance 
 
(1) 
 
Allows more pollution 
than the law permits. 
 
Remedy: Government 
enforcement. More likely 
to be challenged. 
 
 
(3) 
 
Allows more pollution 
than the law permits.  
 
Remedy: Requires 
standing, varies with 
subject area. Less likely to 
be challenged. 
 
 
Overcompliance 
 
(2) 
 
Restricts pollution more 
than the law requires. 
 
Remedy: Private law. Less 
likely to be challenged. 
 
 
(4) 
 
Restricts pollution more 
than the law requires. 
 
Remedy: Regulated party 
challenge to government 
decision. More likely to be 
challenged. 
 
 
The matrix reveals four types of mistakes: (1) market undercompliance; 
(2) market overcompliance; (3) government undercompliance; and (4) 
government overcompliance.  
Category (1), market undercompliance, is perhaps the easiest to 
understand. It makes sense that a robot designed by and for the private 
market would pursue the goal of undercompliance. Classic economic theory 
suggests that a person subject to the law will undercomply to save 
compliance costs so long as the probability of getting caught is less than 
one hundred percent.16  
                                                                                                                 
 16. See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 198-99 (1968) (considering situation where penalties not increased to offset imperfect 
enforcement). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss1/9
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Category (4), government overcompliance, is also straightforward. When 
government administrators are charged with implementing the law, they 
may play it safe by requiring more than is strictly necessary under the law. 
For instance, government may use safe-harbor guidance to describe 
behavior that will definitely and clearly comply.17  
Category (3), government undercompliance, is predicted by the theory of 
public choice and the idea of capture. An industry group, such as a group of 
firms that produce a pollutant, might lobby a government agency to adopt a 
sympathetic interpretation of the law when the agency programs a legal 
compliance robot or chooses the data set on which the robot will base 
decisions.18 Capture and undercompliance could result. 
Category (2) describes market overcompliance. It suggests, in other 
words, the existence of a phenomenon that we can call reverse capture, 
which causes market robots to make decisions that favor the government. A 
market robot might prefer to make conservative decisions about the content 
of the law for several reasons. One possibility is that transaction costs are 
lower because the robot can directly import government guidance, which 
may have conservative or safe-harbor bent.19 Or, the market robot’s users 
may prefer less aggressive positions.20 Or, the market robot’s users may not 
know that the robot is taking less aggressive positions. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1383, 
1392-94 (2016) (giving examples of safe-harbor guidance). 
 18. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT 135, 142 (James W. McKie ed., 1974) (describing a 
“small, relatively homogeneous beneficiary group” that “impos[es] unobtrusive costs on 
large numbers of others”). 
 19. See Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and the Tax 
Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 189, 229-31 (2017) (giving examples of TurboTax repeating 
government guidance verbatim); Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Z. Osofsky, Constituencies and 
Control in Statutory Drafting: Interviews with Government Tax Counsel, 104 IOWA L. REV. 
1291, 1317-18 (2019) (reporting that statutes and guidance are often drafted with a tax 
software audience in mind). 
 20. There could be a division of opinion within an institution like a firm about the right 
level of under- or overcompliance. For instance, less risk-averse shareholders might prefer 
undercompliance, while more risk-averse employees in the compliance department of a firm 
might prefer overcompliance. Cf. GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, 
RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 168-69 (2014) (describing the developing 
multidisciplinary “compliance industry” and the emergence of a new compliance 
profession).  
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B. Challenging Robots’ Legal Mistakes 
The type of mistake made by a robot influences the avenue that can be 
used to challenge the mistake. Market overcompliance mistakes and 
government undercompliance mistakes are less likely to be challenged. 
Market undercompliance mistakes and government overcompliance 
mistakes are more likely to be challenged. 
Consider category (2) mistakes, where the market robot overcomplies 
with the law, and, for example, emits too little pollution. There is no public-
law mechanism to correct this problem of overcompliance. However, a 
private-law mechanism could reverse this decision for the future. For 
instance, a contract between a robot and a user could require the robot to 
take more aggressive positions, or different legal-compliance robots could 
market different levels of compliance.  
With respect to category (3), government undercompliance, it is 
sometimes the case that no challenge is possible. Even if a tax provision 
illegally favors a particular group of taxpayers, other taxpayers (whose 
taxes presumably will increase as a result) generally lack standing to 
challenge the provision directed at the favored group.21 In contrast, in 
environmental law, avenues exist for the general public to claim standing 
and challenge such examples of government undercompliance, 22 even 
though these avenues may be narrow.23 
There is generally an established procedure for challenging category (1), 
market undercompliance. This avenue is government enforcement. Partly 
because of limited resources, government underenforces the law. But the 
process is there and might be made more efficient if the government 
directly targeted market legal-compliance robots.24 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (denying standing to a 
taxpayer objecting to provision of tax law). See generally Linda Sugin, Invisible Taxpayers, 
69 TAX L. REV. 617 (2016). But see generally Nancy Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A 
Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L. J. 771 (2003) 
(reporting cases of taxpayer standing in municipal tax cases). 
 22. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504-06 (2007) (failure of EPA to 
regulate carbon dioxide emissions); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 
U.S. 167, 173-74 (2000) (failure of government regulator to challenge corporation’s 
violation of Clean Water Act).  
 23. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (requiring a 
“concrete and particularized” “injury in fact,” a “causal connection,” and the capacity of a 
court decision to redress the harm). 
 24. See generally Susan Morse, Government-to-Robot Enforcement, 2019 U. ILL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
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Another mistake likely to be challenged is type (4), government 
overcompliance—when the government robot requires more of a regulated 
party than the law does. Examples of government robots improperly 
denying welfare benefits25 or allegedly terminating a public-school 
teacher26 fall into this category. If the harm is big or salient enough, the 
individual harmed by the government decision has an incentive to challenge 
it.  
III. When Are Robot Decisions Final, Even if They Are Mistaken? 
A. Explainability and Finality of Robot Decisions 
When an institution—like the federal or a state government, the 
executive, a court, a regulatory agency, or private ordering—makes a 
decision or takes an action, the law faces a choice. One option is to leave 
the decision or action alone, thus implicitly respecting it as legal. Another 
option is to provide an avenue to challenge the decision.27 
We can observe this pattern in the categories of decisions described 
above. For market robots, undercompliance mistakes might be challenged 
by the government. But overcompliance mistakes are unlikely to be 
challenged.  
For government robots, the pattern is reversed. Overcompliance mistakes 
might be challenged by aggrieved regulated parties. But undercompliance 
mistakes are less likely to be challenged, despite the existence of narrow 
theories of standing in areas such as environmental law.  
Transparency and explainability help us decide whether the action or 
decision is lawful and final. They have a role when a robot’s action or 
decision is challenged. For instance, they are relevant when a market robot 
makes an undercompliance mistake and faces government enforcement. 
Transparency and explainability are also relevant when a government robot 
makes an overcompliance mistake and faces a challenge from a regulated 
party. Especially without explainability, market robots will be poorly 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Citron, supra note 6, at 1256 (describing a state government automated law system 
that incorrectly denied benefits to eligible welfare recipient). 
 26. See, e.g., Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. 
Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
 27. This choice is one object of Hart and Sacks’ classic investigation of the sources of 
law and their idea of institutional settlement. See HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 1, at 158 
(“What is each of [the various U.S. lawmaking institutions] good for? How can it be made to 
do its job best? How does, and how should, its working dovetail with the working of the 
others?”). 
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equipped to defend the validity of undercompliance mistakes, and 
government robots will be less able to defend the validity of 
overcompliance mistakes. Thus, there is an incentive for robot legal 
decision makers to favor the government if they are private market robots 
and to favor the private market, or regulated parties, if they are government 
robots.  
The claim is not that this incentive to avoid legal challenge will control 
robot legal decisions. For instance, it may only partly counteract a market 
robot’s incentive to profit by violating the law. The goal here is simply to 
observe the incentive to avoid legal challenge and to state its 
counterintuitive bent. Robots will face this incentive especially if they 
cannot explain their actions, because a lack of explainability makes it more 
difficult to defend an action under familiar legal standards.  
B. Applying a Negligence Standard to Market Undercompliance 
Private ordering, or the market, is sometimes labeled the “fifth branch” 
of government, particularly when it takes the form of an institution that 
seeks to self-regulate. This label appears to place private ordering after the 
legislature (the first branch), the executive (second), the judiciary (third), 
and government bureaucracy (fourth). Nevertheless, private ordering 
typically comes first in time when new legal issues are presented. That is, 
private ordering initially determines who shall bear liabilities and make 
payments and enjoy benefits, and it is the role of the other branches to limit 
or change those private decisions. 
The Hart and Sacks treatment of the capacity of legal process to validate 
institutions’ legal decisions begins with private ordering.28 The authors’ 
setup is to investigate the government’s role in limiting the market 
decisions that will be respected as lawful, or in helping with gap-filling 
when private agreements are incomplete. They include one private-ordering 
case involving a railroad that required a cattle drover to waive all rights to a 
negligence claim in exchange for the drover’s “free” transport aboard the 
train that also carried the stock in his charge.29 Citing the railroad’s 
common-carrier status and the greater power of the railroad relative to the 
customer, the Supreme Court refused to allow the railroad to waive 
negligence liability. 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 7 (“[T]he individual himself, acting alone or in concert with other private 
individuals, is in the front line of decision, and this fact is of far-reaching importance in the 
whole theory of social ordering.”). 
 29. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 384 (1873). 
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Similarly, commentators who study automated systems have begun to 
suggest that platforms should bear responsibility for some unreasonable 
decisions. Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes, for instance, make this 
suggestion with respect to platform liability for terrorist messages or 
exploitative sexual material on the internet.30 The issue is covered by § 230 
of the Communications Decency Act, which as enacted provides that 
platforms like websites or search engines will not be considered “the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided.”31 Citron and Wittes 
describe the judicial interpretation of this provision as a First Amendment-
based permission for sites advertising illegal commercial sex or spreading 
defamatory rumors.32 They recommend a statutory amendment that would 
require “reasonable steps to prevent . . . unlawful use of . . . services” as a 
prerequisite to the conclusion that a platform did not act as a publisher or 
speaker.33 
If this recommendation became law, it would become necessary to 
decide what “reasonable steps” means. The authors help by giving a good 
example and a bad example. The good example is Twitter, which takes 
seriously “complaints that accounts are being run by designated foreign 
terrorist groups.34” The number of pro-terrorist accounts removed by 
Twitter approaches 400,000. The bad example is Omegle, which apparently 
only warns users that when it matches users with “new friends,” those new 
friends might be sexual predators.35 If Omegle responded to complaints of 
predation by investigating and removing accounts, the authors suggest, 
perhaps it too would be eligible for immunity from liability under § 230.36 
If the idea of “reasonable steps” followed the established path of other 
similar inquiries in law, it would require some understanding of how the 
automated system processes the complaints. What criteria does a platform 
use to determine that an account should be removed? Does it automatically 
remove an account in response to a complaint, or does it investigate the 
particulars of the charge? Understanding how the platform compares the 
evidence in a complaint to the content of the law prohibiting certain 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not 
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017). 
 31. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018). 
 32. Citron & Wittes, supra note 30, at 413-14 (giving examples of providers granted 
immunity under § 230). 
 33. Id. at 419. 
 34. Id. at 418. 
 35. Id. at 401. 
 36. Id. at 417-18. 
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behavior on the internet presumably forms the content of a “reasonable 
steps” analysis. It is like comparing a particular doctor’s actions to accepted 
practice to determine whether the doctor demonstrated a reasonable degree 
of care, skill, and learning in connection with a malpractice case. 
Without such an analysis of the reasonableness of a platform’s 
procedures, which requires some degree of explainability of its automatic 
decisions, what would happen? In the absence of such information about its 
process, perhaps the platform would not be able to defend a decision to 
leave an account open after receiving a complaint. It might look instead for 
a way to avoid legal challenge altogether. If the platform could avoid legal 
challenge by showing that it always takes down content in response to 
complaints, perhaps it might adopt an automatic takedown policy instead.37 
If no one sues the platform to complain about removing content, then a 
policy of overcompliance via automatic takedown is an attractive option. 
Such a policy would cause the law to drift in the opposite direction from its 
initial bias. The platform’s content might become too censored, rather than 
not censored enough. 
C. Applying Procedural Due Process Requirements to Government 
Overcompliance 
Administrative agency bureaucrats participate in the “fourth branch” of 
government. They present the question of when to respect agency legal 
decisions as final determinations of law. Administrative procedure plays an 
important role in this issue. For example, procedural due process precedent 
requires not only fair procedures but also procedures that minimize error.38 
Cary Coglianese and David Lehr provide an optimistic view of how 
administrative procedure law and automatic regulation might together 
evolve to allow explainable robot decision-making that satisfies procedural 
due process requirements.39 They review the three-prong Mathews v. 
Goldberg balancing test, which considers the private interest at stake; the 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, 
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1185-86 (2008) (noting 
the problem of possible negative externalities resulting from the filtering and organizing of 
search results by algorithms). 
 38. Reason-giving is an element of defending an administrative action against 
Administrative Procedure Act claims, such as claims of arbitrary and capricious action, see 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018), as well as against constitutional claims such as procedural due 
process claims. 
 39. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision-
Making in the Machine Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1184-91 (2017) [hereinafter 
Coglianese & Lehr, Regulating by Robot]. 
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risk of error as a result of the administrative procedure and the likely error-
correction benefit of a proposed change; and the Government’s interest, 
including the resources required to administer the law using different 
procedures.40 Coglianese and Lehr point out that the first point (the private 
interest) is “exogenous” to whether a government adjudication is made by 
an algorithm or a human. The third, they say, will weigh in favor of using 
efficient automatic or robotic adjudication.  
The second Mathews point, relating to the risk of error and the 
possibility that a different process would reduce errors still further, is the 
hard one. In Coglianese and Lehr’s view, a government robot can and will 
evolve to allow the validation and “cross-examination” of its automatic 
decision-making process. If it does so, the government robot will have 
achieved sufficient transparency and explainability to defend its procedures 
and provide enough reasons to defend its decisions against regulated 
parties’ charge of mistakes of overcompliance.41 
The same authors42 refer to a recent Texas case about the firing of 
Houston schoolteachers based on the results of a secret algorithm that 
considered, among other factors, the test scores of a student in a teacher’s 
classroom. The court denied the school district summary judgment on the 
teacher union’s procedural due process claim. The results given by the 
algorithm for a certain teacher could not be replicated to check for errors, in 
part because the results for one teacher were related to the results for other 
teachers, so that changing a data input for one teacher would affect 
everyone else’s score.43  
One question facing the Houston school district on this issue is whether 
to engage or avoid the procedural due process question. It could perhaps 
give plaintiffs access to the internal information and programming to allow 
the adjudication of such a procedural due process issue. But it could also 
change its decision-making process to reduce the chance of such a claim, 
for instance by forgoing the interrelated ranking feature which now appears 
to be part of its review process. 
If the Houston school district chooses to defend its decision by sharing 
information, it will be an example of government fulfilling the promise of 
algorithmic governance by adjusting to the demands of existing law—that 
is, by making its procedures explainable. A court could ease this process by 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 41. See Coglianese & Lehr, Regulating by Robot, supra note 39, at 1184-91. 
 42. See Coglianese & Lehr, Transparency, supra note 12, at 37-38. 
 43. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 
1168, 1172 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
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adopting a flexible and modern concept of reason-giving, as Coglianese and 
Lehr recommend. 
But the Houston school district could also choose the latter route, for 
instance by abandoning its commitment to rank teachers relative to one 
another, in order to make its decisions easier to explain and defend. This 
latter, defensive route would cause a change in the development of the law. 
For instance, it might increase teachers’ job security, because that change 
would reduce the chance of challenge to government decisions about 
teacher retention. 
D. What If Robot Processes Are Not Explainable? 
If robot processes are sufficiently transparent and explainable, then both 
market robots and government robots may defend the legality and finality 
of their decisions by showing the validity of their process. For instance, 
market robots might persuade a court that their process of decision-making 
is reasonable, or nonnegligent. Government robots might persuade a court 
that their process of adjudicating a claim adequately guards against error. 
If robot processes are not sufficiently transparent and explainable, then it 
will be more difficult for market and government robots to defend their 
decisions as legal and final. Automated systems will have an incentive to 
make decisions that will not face legal challenge. Market robots would be 
more likely to overcomply with the law, and government robots would be 
more likely to undercomply with the law. This result is contrary to the usual 
prediction that private ordering tends to undercomply with the law while 
government guidance may overcomply. 
Whether this counterintuitive prediction comes true depends on what 
other incentives robots face. For instance, a private-market robot’s profit 
motive is another important factor.44 The problem of explainability and the 
incentive to avoid legal challenge may reduce, but not erase, a market 
robot’s incentive to violate the law in order to increase profits. It might 
offset, but not eliminate, tax preparation software companies’ incentive to 
violate taxpayer confidentiality law. On the other hand, the incentive to 
avoid having to explain results might exacerbate a market robot’s tendency 
                                                                                                                 
 44. In addition, sometimes the robot’s customer is not the regulated party. In consumer 
credit reports, the consumer is arguably the regulated party, since applicable rules determine 
how her credit report should be generated. But the profit motive of a robot-generated credit 
report runs to the banks that purchase the reports. See Angela Littwin, Escaping Battered 
Credit: A Proposal for Repairing Credit Reports Damaged by Domestic Violence, 161 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 363, 381-83 (2013) (noting that credit reporting agencies’ “main revenue 
source is the [lenders] who purchase credit reports”). 
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to overcomply, especially if overcompliance will not materially reduce user 
revenue. It might increase tax preparation software companies’ tendency to 
take safe positions under substantive tax law.45  
In circumstances where a market robot overcomplies or a government 
robot undercomplies because of the incentives described here, the question 
may arise as to whether this new drift in the law is normatively good. Most 
likely, the answer to this question will depend on context. For instance, take 
the pollution example used to illustrate the different categories of robot 
legal mistakes above in Part II. Context helps determine whether to favor a 
move toward market overcompliance or government undercompliance.  
Assume, for example, that a person believes that environmental law is 
not strict enough, that is, that it allows too much pollution. Assume further 
that private-market systems dominate the area of pollution-emissions 
compliance. The person who prefers less pollution would welcome a result 
that would cause a market robot to overcomply with the law and limit or 
restrict pollution even more than required. This person may prefer 
nonexplainability so that the market system cannot defend its emissions 
decisions by proving that they are reasonable.  
Now take the same person who prefers less pollution, but change the 
hypothetical to assume that government robot systems, rather than market 
robots, dominate the area of pollution-emissions compliance. Now, this 
same person might prefer that government robots are sufficiently 
transparent and explainable. Then, government can defend its decisions 
against the challenge of a regulated party that asserts that the government 
decisions are invalid because they cannot be explained. If the government 
lacks this defense, it may decide to avoid challenges from regulated parties 
by undercomplying rather than overcomplying with the law. 
Another way to see the value of explainability is to observe that it would 
protect existing pathways for different government institutions to provide a 
check on each other. Government enforcement helps check market 
decisions. Judicial review of regulated party challenges helps check 
government decisions. If we think that the legal controversies resulting 
from these checks benefit the development of the law, then we should 
prefer to sustain them as methods of confirming institutional competence. 
This in turn is a reason to encourage robots to develop ways of explaining 
how they make decisions, and to encourage the law to develop ways of 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See Morse, supra note 7 (explaining different tax software compliance incentives for 
taxpayer confidentiality law compared with substantive tax law).  
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understanding robots’ legal process. Otherwise, robot legal decisions may 
develop in a way that avoids legal challenge altogether. 
Conclusion 
The questions presented by robots’ legal mistakes are familiar to legal 
scholarship. They are part of the general inquiry about when we will accept 
legal decisions, like those made through private ordering or administrative 
action. Decision-making robots might be market robots or government 
robots. In either category, they can make mistakes of undercompliance or 
overcompliance. 
Some robot mistakes are more reviewable than others. A market robot’s 
overcompliance mistake or a government robot’s undercompliance mistake 
is relatively unlikely to be challenged. On the other hand, government 
enforcement can challenge a market robot’s undercompliance mistake, and 
an aggrieved regulated party can object to a government robot’s 
overcompliance mistake. 
Explainability is relevant to the question of whether to accept a robot’s 
decision as a final statement of the law. This is because explainability can 
justify the process of decision as legitimate, for instance because it is 
reasonable or nonnegligent. Explainability provides a pathway for 
validating robot action. 
If robot systems are not explainable, or if courts do not recognize their 
way of explaining as legitimate under the law, then robots will be left 
without this means of defending their actions. They may be more likely to 
make counterintuitive decisions that will avoid the prospect of legal 
challenge. For instance, subject to other relevant factors including the profit 
motive of market robots, a lack of explainability is likely to encourage 
market robots to overcomply and government robots to undercomply. 
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